This article discusses -and rejects -cyberutopia, an idealized theory of internet use that requires users to leave their bodies behind when online. The author instead calls for a cyberfeminist perspective in relation to studying the internet and other new media, centrally locating corporeality and embodiment. The underutilized concept of intra-agency is then employed to develop liminality in relation to the experience of going online. The author then outlines different versions of cyberfeminism and endorses that which addresses the relationships between the lived experiences of users and the technology itself. The article concludes with a call for theorists to expand and enrich the concepts used to study new media.
experience of the internet. Butler (1999) and Grosz's (1994 Grosz's ( , 2001 ) arguments for placing embodiment and corporeality at the center of performativity are examined, while also addressing the idea of articulation and Barad's (2003) understanding of intra-agency. Subsequently, the concept of liminality is developed and applied to cyberspace, not as the crossing of a 'threshold' of a noncorporeal place, but as an experience of the intraagency of body and medium. Drawing on these concepts, I advocate a version of cyberfeminism that rejects 'leaving the body behind' while simultaneously rejecting a cyberfeminism based on viewing the medium as a simple extension of the body. In conclusion, I offer some suggestions for future research, including a call for more in-depth examination of the internet as a medium and its relation to our bodies.
Identifying cyberutopia
Technological 'progress' or the introduction of a new medium into the daily experience of social beings often brings with it a proliferation of rhetoric concerning the medium. The advent of the telegraph, the radio, the telephone, and the television -all these media introduced new discourses and impacted our understanding of the world. Often, the original purposes for which a medium is developed is reworked by its users; one ready example of this is the telephone, which originally was considered to be a tool for businessmen to facilitate their work and whose use was reformulated as a means to stay in touch or reconnect with friends or family (van Zoonen, 2002) .
So it is with the internet, originally designed by the US military. Despite its origin as a highly limited-use medium 'deeply embedded in masculine codes and values ' (van Zoonen, 2002: 6) the internet now has global reach, with females comprising nearly half of all internet users in the USA (Pew Internet and American Life Project, 2005) . Some of the rhetoric surrounding the internet, particularly in reference to gender and the internet, has been utopian in nature. The internet is sometimes extolled as a space where one can be or become anyone. As Sobchack (2004) writes, 'man's lived body … in all its material facticity, its situatedness, its finitude, and its limitations, seemed to have been transubstantiated through textualization into the infinite possibility, receptivity, literality, and irresponsibility of the "pure" sign ' (p. 167) .
For some feminist scholars, the potential of the internet as a space to explore the 'pure' sign has opened new vistas for personal exploration and growth. As MorahanMartin (2000) writes, online anonymity 'frees individuals of social and physical restraints, and has allowed women to express parts of themselves that they might not otherwise in a safe environment, enabling them to explore new identities, heal inner wounds, and express sexuality ' (p. 683) . In such discourses of liberation, the internet can be a place where differences and social contexts are erased, creating a true meritocracy or a utopian ideal. As Sunden (2001) notes in her discussion of the various types of cyberfeminism, one version of early cyberfeminism holds that on 'the Internet among disembodied subjectivities, [a] feminist utopia could be realized ' (p. 215) .
The cyberutopian theme relies primarily on the principle of disembodiment. Leaving behind the body -and its associated sex, gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, religion, (dis) ability, and so on -frees the user to be judged solely on their online presence, which they are able to carefully construct. The internet is a space where one has the chance to 'trade-in, remodel, or even leave behind the physical nature with which we are, in reality, burdened' (Paterson, 1998) . For feminists desiring a cyberutopia, the internet is an exciting 'playground for the experimenting with gender symbols and identity, a space to escape from the dichotomy of gender and the boundaries produced by physical bodies ' (van Zoonen, 2002: 12) . The internet can be viewed as a gathering place for feminists and as a place to enact or perform gender subversions. It is a place where women -typically limited by their physicality and its associated bodily subjugation -can experiment with fewer social or bodily consequences.
Such cyberlibertarian rhetoric 'draws on an abstract, disembodied concept of the individual that is far removed from the concrete day-to-day practices which make individuality and forms of togetherness possible in the first place' (Kelemen and Smith, 2001: 377) . This abstraction lays a foundation for a universal ground of interaction -a possible unifying force, encouraging solidarity and collective action. However, the same abstractions have within them the possibility of essentializing the concepts they represent. Women, in their multitude of site-specific social locations, become Woman. As Sunden warns in her essay on the She-Cyborg (2001), any instance 'where "the meat" is left behind and the disembodied consciousness released from its earthly groundings … [will] repeat the classical patriarchal model ' (p. 216) .
The work of Waskul and Douglass (1997) illustrates the fluidity allowed users in online contexts. Through interviews and observation of users in online chat rooms, the authors demonstrate the importance of anonymity and disembodiment as related to users' production of 'cyberselves'. Despite the importance and attendant freedom proffered by anonymity and the nature of online interaction as a 'hyperreal simulacrum of communication -neither real nor imaginary' (p. 380), the authors also note that there are continual efforts by users to 'test' other users' performances. Much effort is put forth in online interaction to 'emplace' or 'engender' users; that is, to establish with some sort of fixity a user's 'a/s/l' or age, sex and location. To underestimate the importance of users' desire to emplace and engender other users is to potentially undermine efforts to address the material specificities of user's lives and the repercussions of the processes of representation.
The anonymous freedom to 'try on' genders or sexualities without social recourse is often cited as one of the most liberating dimensions of life online; however, a user may reify and enact stereotypes, thereby reinforcing the normative understandings of gender, sexuality, race or ethnicity. This, in theory, can recreate and reify the same limiting norms which may have encouraged the user to experiment with gender and sexuality in the first place. In this way, lauding cyberspace as merely a disembodied utopian dream masks the processes and performances that re-create and re-enact oppressive normative social structures -both in cyberspace and in our shared bodily space. Adopting a cyberutopia that masks opportunities to understand the processes and performances of gender norms undermines feminist efforts to directly address these normative practices, including 'compulsory heterosexuality' (Rich, 1994) or 'the tyranny of gender' (Danet, 1998) .
A second danger of cyberutopia is that by separating a user from her or his sitespecific socioeconomic location, all users are assumed to represent the dominant (sex, race, class, etc.) -what Lisa Nakamura (1999) calls 'default whiteness'. Nakamura notes that many advocates of the internet as a liberatory space claim 'if no one's body is visible while participating in cyberspace, theoretically racism and bigotry cannot exist at that time ' (p. 107) . Ironically, many users experience heightened personal attacks and discrimination in cyberspace. Several scholars have studied the practice of 'flaming' (a form of harassment) online, as well as cyber-stalking and sexual harassment online (see Bostdorff, 2004) . As Nakamura discusses, 'conversations about how the web can "wipe out" race may obscure the fact that users do indeed possess bodies that are racedbodies that are denied housing and discriminated against in job interviews and that suffer institutional forms of racism ' (1999: 107) . Users online are assumed white -and are often assumed male, middle-class, technologically savvy, and on US-based sites, Christian. The seduction of thinking of cyberspace as cyberutopia belies the reality of daily lived experiences outside of cyberspace.
Constructing users in cyberspace as 'free' potentially relieves cyberfeminists of the burden of addressing the lived experiences of racism (or sexism, homophobia, and other forms of discrimination). As Stormer (2004: 269) describes in his account of the mind/ body dualism, some people seek to 'distance themselves from the embodied world because it was well understood as a site of oppression. The often metaphysical claims of moral, intellectual, and spiritual equality speak to distinctly separate orders of things and discourses'. It is often easier to advocate a new space for 'moral, intellectual, and spiritual equality' than it is to deal with discrimination and oppression in already-extant and occupied space. However, given the proliferation of activism and grassroots efforts aided by the internet, as well as the exchange of information via online interaction, it is important to note that there is not a simple and easy disassociation of online and off. Cyberfeminists should not understand cyberspace as a utopian replacement for the spaces of lived experiences, but rather as an augmentation of those spaces. These complex interrelations should not be reduced to a bifurcation of online and offline where either is considered entirely separate from and unaffected by the other; rather, the material conditions of the offline world need to remain visible to scholars.
For example, the internet has been lauded as a resource for women's upward mobility, particularly in networking and career development (for a nuanced examination of this position, see Woodfield, 2000) . While the internet may, in fact, offer (some) women new occasions for career development, this urge to view cyberspace as opening new vistas of opportunity makes several tenuous assumptions. First, the sliver of working women -and it is a sliver -who have or may benefit from networking or career development are benefiting only if we proscribe to a very narrow, individualized and liberal understanding of progress. Whether one is addressing the technology itself or the construction of 'women's success', the underlying assumption is one of progress, or a constant linear movement. Such a narrow view does not question the nature of gendered labor and women's experiences. The 'empowerment' in terms of career development for women is considered primarily from a highly individualized, liberal feminist understanding. And even those resources available for women in this narrow understanding are often questionable in worth to feminists. As Worthington (2005) notes, 'the flexible nature of the Internet seems to offer a progressive alternative to traditional mainstream media's consistent devaluation of female labor … [but] the commercial nature of many Web sites often prevents fulfillment of that promise ' (p. 56) . At the very least, cyberutopian positions do not address the negative impacts of technology for women's labor on a global scale (see Basi, 2009) .
A further danger of cyberutopia is the reinforcement of the mind/body dualism. As Grosz discusses in her advocacy for a corporeal feminism, Feminists and philosophers seem to share a common view of the human subject as a being made up of two dichotomously opposed characteristics: mind and body, thought and extension, reason and passion, psychology and biology. This bifurcation of being is not simply a neutral division of an otherwise all-encompassing descriptive field. Dichotomous thinking necessarily hierarchizes and ranks the two polarized terms so that one becomes the privileged term and the other its suppressed, subordinated, negative counterpart. (1994: 3) This Cartesian dualism is heavily entrenched in Western society; the naturalized distinctions between mind/body, rational/emotional, and culture/nature -all of these dualisms are hierarchized; with the first term considered the dominant. Not only do dualisms hierarchize the terms involved, the binary structure 'infinitizes the negative term, rendering it definitionally amorphous, the receptacle of all that is excessive or expelled from the circuit of the privileged term' (Grosz, 2001: 95) . Thus, 'Man' is valorized for what qualities he has; 'Woman' becomes all that he is not.
The rhetoric of cyberutopia reinforces this dualism, the freedom of the mind to represent and act at will without the 'burden' of the body (Paterson, 1998) . The internet, in this context, is interpreted as an equalizing platform and space, where the necessary/naturalized complications of 'the body' are removed. This interpretation denies that the body is necessary for participation online. One requires a body to interact with whatever machine allows a user to join the online, not to mention the financial/technological means to access the machine itself and the material habit of how to use it. As Langellier and Peterson note in a study of weblog users, a person can read or write a weblog only to the extent that she or he is bodily capable of doing so … reading and writing weblogs requires bodily discipline (the ability to orient, reach for, and grasp or accomplish a task) and a disciplined body (a body trained to read and write, to manipulate a keyboard, to use computers and access the Internet). (2004: 166) As such, material elements of the 'real world' are inherently bound up in and with technologies of the virtual. Beneath the cyberutopian ideal of equality 'a wide range of knowledges and cultural belongings are being hidden' (Sunden, 2001: 224) . In a very basic sense, to assume the Internet is the site of an egalitarian cyberutopia is to necessarily negate that utopia; that is, the space itself excludes all who do not have access, those who do not have the cultural and technical knowledge required to participate and/or those who do not have the physical ability to participate in the utopian dream. This negation of utopia is only magnified once the myth of the 'global' network is more closely examined, for a 'digital divide' exists between more developed nations and less developed nations (for more information, see www.itu.int).
In sum, a simplistic egalitarian ideal of cyberutopia necessitates disembodiment, denies the situated and lived experiences of individuals, and reinforces the mind/body dualism. These pitfalls can lead cyberutopists to ignore and/or downplay inequalities that exist in 'real' space, as well as ignore the reification of gender and sexuality norms in cyberspace. For theorists engaged with the internet as a medium, adopting a cyberutopian stance might prohibit scholarship and activism that enhances the ideals of cyberutopianism; that is, adopting this stance often refuses attempts to engage critically with patriarchal codes, the performance of gender and sexuality and the daily experiences of users of the internet on-and offline.
In light of continued development of online interaction, particularly in light of increasingly complex media convergence and the maturation of the 'internet generation', scholars must resist oversimplified theories of internet interaction. The relationship of the mind to technology and the relationship of the body to technology can no longer be separated; these relationships are a complex performance of embodiment in which we are deeply intertwined with the technology.
Corporeality -rejecting the universal body
Much of feminist scholarship attempts to develop a framework for understanding the relationship(s) of body, sex, and gender. Often, sex and gender are reduced to a dualism: sex/gender, where -as in other dualisms -sex is essentialized and privileged over gender. In this way, sex 'trumps' gender and sex is the determinant concept; that is, gender is inscribed or socially constructed on the body, which is (naturally) sexed. Feminist theorists then find themselves attempting to negate or counteract the social construction of the body as a source of oppression while also rejecting the idea of sexual determinacy -that is, the naturalizing of the female body as the source of its oppression. In the vein of sexual determinacy, women 'are' one way because of the biological limitations of their bodies. On the flip side, feminists who attempt to reject sexual determinacy are compelled to 'affirm women's bodily specificity as the minimal consensual stuff which grounds feminist practice' (Cheah, 1996: 108) . It is possible to reject the (explicitly female) body as the 'minimal consensual stuff' for feminist practice and instead adopt a feminism that rests on the 'idea that gender is not at all a monolithic category that makes all women the same; rather, it is the mark of a position of subordination, which is qualified by a number of powerful variables' (Braidotti, 1994: 259) . These variables include race and ethnicity, as well as socioeconomic status, among others.
Adopting a social constructivist position from which to enact scholarship, on the other hand, considers sex 'either as natural and thus unconstructed or as the fictional premise of a prediscursive ground produced by the concept of gender' (Cheah, 1996: 109) . Thus, sex is (determines) everything or sex is (determines) nothing; the body becomes 'irrelevant or becomes the vehicle expressing changes in beliefs and values ' (Cheah, 1996: 110) . Since Butler's original publication of Gender Trouble in 1990, many feminist scholars have turned from social constructivism to embrace theories of embodiment and corporeality (Barad, 2003; Boler, 2007; Grosz, 1994) . Patterson and Corning (1997) published an annotated bibliography of scholarship regarding the body, stressing the importance of re-evaluating the 'assumptions underlying the use of a universalized body, the body of "Man", in terms of the sexual, racial, classed, and political body' (p. 8). Much selflabeled postmodern, poststructuralist or postcolonial scholarship specifically addresses the importance of local, site-specific understandings of culture, social relations and an emphasis on the lived experiences of individuals -coinciding with the rise of what some term 'identity politics' (see Hanisch, 1970) . Rejecting the universal body draws attention to the body-specific; in essence, 'attention to the body challenges what counts today as knowledge by rejecting the mind/body dualisms, historical constructions of gender, and cultural inscriptions of meaning that underlie the politics of class, race, gender, and age' (Patterson and Corning, 1997: 9) .
In terms of internet use, a rejection of the mind/body dualism requires an interrogation of referring to the Internet as a space where one leaves the body behind. McGerty accuses scholars of supporting a 'false dichotomy of on/offline, [failing] to locate internet users firmly within the context of their use and have singularly failed therefore to locate [internet communication technologies] adequately within fundamental relations of gender, [sexuality], race and class' (McGerty, 2000: 896) . McGerty instead encourages developing a more nuanced approach to the complex and mutually impacting relationships between user and technology. The online and offline worlds are deeply entangled, as are human relations with many other technologies. If we hope to better understand the multiple intersections of self and technology, we must move beyond the simple mind/body bifurcation. However, rejecting the mind/body dualism can leave us without a theoretical base for understanding the individual's relationship and interaction with the world.
Performativity and articulation
Understanding performativity or articulation calls for a brief review of social constructivism and the limitations associated with that theoretical perspective. Social constructivism holds that knowledge comes 'from within a relationship, in which, in its articulation, others around us continually exert a morally coercive force upon us to be persons of a particular kind, to assume a particular identity, and to exhibit a particular kind of sensibility' (Shotter and Gergen, 1994: 6, emphasis in original) . Therefore, no one's identity or reality is created in a vacuum; it is through dialogue, participation in discourse and interaction that sense of self is developed. Thus, social constructivism is an anthropocentric theory; it holds [human] language and interaction through [human] language as the sole source of agency in the construction of the self.
Before a person is even born, Lyotard (1989: 15) argues, she or he is part of the social bond and language game, 'if only by the virtue of the name he [sic] is given, the human child is already positioned as the referent in the story recounted by those around him, in relation to which he will inevitably chart his course'. Most interaction between individuals takes place within the context of language, and experiences are remembered, shared, reconstituted or constructed within language as well. The limitations and rules of language often parallel the limitations of social interaction, and Gergen (1991) argues the language of 'sense-making preexists the individual, it is "always already" there, available for social usage' (Gergen, 1991: 107) .
Limitations of language are reflected in and (from a social constructivist position) constitute relationships; for example, I cannot refer to a person in English with a nongendered pronoun unless I use 'it', a wholly unsatisfying and socially unacceptable way of referring to a person. Likewise, the social construction of gender is strained and tested by transgendered or androgynous persons, and those who interact with alternatively gendered persons struggle to find the 'right' pronouns to talk about them, with them or to them. This is true in online situations as well (see Danet's 1998 exploration of the 'gender pronoun' settings of LambdaMOO and MediaMOO).
While social constructivism offers some useful tools to scholars attempting to understand the formation of identity and the relations between individuals and language, it is problematic because it takes as its starting point a tabula rasa of being, the body as prediscursive. This privileges language use as the 'mind' or 'self'-making process. This naturalizes the mind/body dualism in ways that elevate the body as the determinate factor of selfhood or, conversely, as irrelevant. As Butler notes, 'any discourse that established the boundaries of the body serves the purpose of instating and naturalizing certain taboos regarding the appropriate limits, postures, and modes of exchange that define what it is that constitutes bodies ' (1999: 166) . Thus, endorsing a position of social constructivism takes for granted an a priori (i.e. before-language and beforerelationship) existence of a body, uncritically examined. This body is then the site of the social construction of the self through relationships.
This uncritical acceptance of the body as a tabula rasa not only reifies traditional dualism of mind/body, but also reifies accompanying dualisms such as reason/emotion and male/female. Grosz (1994: 12) advocates a version of Spinoza's philosophy to supplant the Cartesian affinity for the mind/body dualism. In her account, the body is a monadic entity constantly reconstituting itself. It is a dynamic, irreducible thing. The body is ever-changing, and bodies are 'historical, social, cultural weavings of biology … not being self-identical, the body must be seen as a series of processes of becoming, rather than as a fixed state of being'. In contrast, for dualistic thinking, the body remains relatively fixed (after puberty, 'naturally') while the mind is dynamic and reconstitutive. It is the mind, then, that is prized over the body, which at its very least is a container and at its very most a biological determinant.
Butler's discussion of performativity also addresses embodiment, though in different terms than Grosz. Butler notes that 'performativity is not a singular act, but a repetition and a ritual, which achieves its effects through its naturalization in the context of a body, understood, in part as a culturally sustained temporal duration' (1999: xv, emphasis added). Some authors have criticized Butler's performativity as granting too much power to language, though the same argument has been leveled against social constructivism. The question becomes why 'are these linguistic norms powerful enough to constitute us but not powerful enough to constitute us in any way that they please?' (Allen, 1999: 79) . Or, as Zita (1996: 787) notes, authors are reopening the 'question of the body's materiality, seeking to rescue the body from discursive evaporation without returning to the mire of biological essentialism'. Barad replies,
[P]erformativity, properly construed, is not an invitation to turn everything (including material bodies) into words; on the contrary, performativity is precisely a contestation of the excessive power granted to language to determine what is real … performativity is actually a contestation of the unexamined habits of mind that grant language and other forms of representation more power in determining our ontologies than they deserve. (2003: 802) For Butler, performativity is the 'effect' of iterated performances, that is, my 'womanhood' is the effect over time of my iterative performances of gender. Performance is not merely the recitation of words, but rather an embodied moment in which 'bodies and language are mutually emergent' (Stormer, 2004: 267) . In these performances, I am reiterating (citing) heterosexual gender norms. The key concept here, for my theoretical project, is the idea of embodiment that simultaneously 'recognizes one's both being a body and having a body' (Behrenshausen, 2006: 44, emphasis in original). Though critics of Butler have argued that Gender Trouble denies the materiality of the body, a synthesis of Butler and Grosz understands the body as produced through and in performance.
The qualities of the internet as a medium order our experience in a specific way; that is, boundaries are created at the moment of performance. The performative act of 'entering' the internet is an articulation; that is, a performative 'formation of order, of the body and of speech, bringing together the material world, language, and spatial arrangement in one act' (Stormer, 2004: 263) . As in Grosz's moment of 'becoming', the material body is (re)established at the moment of the act; it does not preexist the articulation except wherein it has already been articulated -or, the body does not preexist the performance but its perceived continuity is the effect of performativity. Our experience of 'reality' then, is not 'composed of things-in-themselves or things-behind-phenomena' but rather is made up of an 'ongoing flow of agency through which "part" of the world makes itself differentially intelligible to another "part" of the world and through which local causal structures, boundaries, and properties are stabilized and destabilized' (Barad, 2003: 817) . Perhaps the most significant repercussion of this is the understanding that these performances or articulations do not 'take place in space and time [but constitute] the making of spacetime itself' (Barad, 2003: 817) . As such, bodies are subject to the same; that is, they are not already there, but are constituted in performance. The experience of corporeality, of having a body, is similar to Butler's gender 'effect' -it is the constant and dynamic citation or re-iterability of performances over time.
If one uses performativity as a theoretical base from which to understand agency and performative acts, 'the material body marked by gender, race and class not only forms the physical ground for the cyberspace traveler, but is also clearly introduced and reproduced in the new electronic spaces it inhabits' (Sunden, 2001: 225) . One cannot engage in, on or with the medium without one's body. While the communicative acts literally happen in a 'placeless place' with others who are not physically co-present, to overlook the relationships between the material and the virtual or to downplay the role of the material world in the construction, maintenance and use of the virtual is to miss the opportunity to engage in scholarship that recognizes the importance of such interplay.
Another way of understanding performativity is that of discursive practices (Barad, 2003) . For Barad, discursive practices 'define what counts as meaningful statements … discursive practices are the local sociohistorical material conditions that enable and constrain disciplinary knowledge practices … [they] produce, rather than merely describe, the "subjects" and "objects" of knowledge practices' (p. 819). Key to understanding Barad's discursive practices is her development of intra-agency, a useful theoretical concept. Barad (2003) draws heavily upon the work of Danish physicist Niels Bohr, who contributed to the understanding of quantum physics. For Bohr, 'things do not have inherently determinate boundaries or properties, and words do not have inherently determinate meanings' (Barad, 2003: 813) . A classic example of this is measuring light: measured one way, light has wave-like properties; measured another way, light has particle-like properties. Barad uses Bohr's understanding of physics to shape her own concept of agency and performativity.
Intra-agency
In order to discuss Barad's posthumanist performativity, one must first understand her appropriation of Bohr's idea of measurement as apparatus. An apparatus is more than the traditional definition of a tool, machine or instrument. For Barad, apparatuses are arrangements that 'are dynamic (re)configurings of the world, specific agential practices/ intra-actions/performances through which specific exclusionary boundaries are enacted ' (2003: 816, emphasis in original) . In other words, an apparatus is a certain way of ordering the world that has agency in that it simultaneously limits and enables how the world is rendered intelligible. Apparatuses are the 'exclusionary practices of mattering through which intelligibility and materiality are constituted ' (2003: 820) . Apparatuses are agential in precisely this way -they limit or enable, exclude or permit, and draw the boundaries of possibility. In the same vein as Schrodinger's cat -which posits that without direct observation and measurement (human agency and apparatus agency) the cat in question is neither living nor dead -we (as agents) cannot 'know' the world without apparatuses, which also have agency.
Herein I have discussed the agency of humans and the agency of 'things' (apparatuses) as two distinct things; in doing so I mean not to privilege one over the other, or indeed mark that there is a difference between the agency of an apparatus and the agency of a human. To do so would be to subscribe to anthropocentrism and in some ways support the internal/external, mind/body dualism. I have discussed them as separate entities only to render the discussion intelligible in terms of the mind/body dualism. The agency granted to any specific entity or thing is not a stable given; that is to say, there are degrees of agency involved in the specific act or phenomena. For example, think of a deep-sea diver -the agency of her equipment is substantial; it simultaneously limits and enables her own agency in the situation. Thus, the constructivist or representationalist questions of the relationship(s) between words and things are rejected; instead, Barad advocates 'a causal relationship between specific exclusionary practices embodied as specific material configurations of the world … and specific material phenomena … theoretical concepts … are not ideational in character but rather are specific physical arrangements ' (2003: 814, emphasis in original) . In other words, specific practices (such as discursive practices like conversing or being online) and specific material configurations (such as an apparatus like a board game or a computer) interact (or have intra-agency) to materialize phenomenon. In this way all bodies come to 'matter' (materialize) 'through the world's iterative intra-activity -its performativity' (Barad, 2003: 823) . Applying Barad's understanding of performativity leads us to an understanding of interaction and agency that allows us to reject social constructivism's a priori body, for the body is 'neither a passive surface awaiting the mark of culture nor the end product of cultural performances' (Barad, 2003: 827) . The body, instead, is an intra-agential phenomenon, limited and enabled by the intra-agential phenomena of space and time, as well as other agential phenomena. In terms of applying this form of performativity to the online experience, one begins to understand and appreciate the complexity of recognizing non-humans as agential; that is, the computer as apparatus limits and enables (i.e., has intra-agency) what the user can 'do' or perform online. Instead of viewing the technology or the medium as something distinct from individuals and individuals distinct from their performance of gender, for example, 'in the concrete social practices of the everyday they work inextricably together in their interpellation and positioning of women and men ' (van Zoonen, 2002: 16) .
The performative act of 'entering' the internet is an articulation, an intra-agential experience sensitive to 'the contrary requirements, to the exigencies, to the pressures of conflicting agencies where none of them is really in command' (Latour, 2003: 33) . This experience of entering the internet is a liminal one; a concept explored in more detail here.
Liminality in the context of intra-agency
Liminality is often understood in terms of rites of passage, as in Victor Turner's The Ritual Process (1969) . However, a limen can also be viewed as a 'threshold, a border, a margin, a transitional space, a site of negotiation and struggle' (Langellier, 1999: 138) . The term has been applied in studies of the internet (Madge and O'Connor, 2005; Waskul, 2005) . For Madge and O'Connor, who conducted a study of young mothers and their use of the internet and internet communities to 'try on' versions of motherhood, liminality 'enables a way of thinking about cyberspace as a generative space which both operates as a metaphor but also represents lived practices, where alternatives to binaries may be thought out and lived through ' (2005: 93) . It is feasible to fold in Madge and O'Connor's understanding of liminality into Barad's construction of performativity; that is, as a generative space. However, lauding the internet as a liminal space because it is a disembodied space overlooks the context of intra-agency and body-apparatus interaction. That is, if one attributes the experience of liminality singularly to an ekstasis of representation (Waskul, 2005) , one loses the opportunity to examine the complex interactions afforded by the body-apparatus interaction.
Consider, for a moment, Butler's (1999) rejection of the mind/body dualism. She describes the policing of inner and outer worlds in terms of the body and the taboos placed upon the permeation of the body and its orifices. We as a culture prefer to maintain a strict distinction between inner and outer worlds, but for the 'inner and outer worlds to remain utterly distinct, the entire surface of the body would have to achieve an impossible impermeability' (Butler, 1999: 170) . In the same vein, Cheah discusses the idea of torsion, or the 'rotation from interiority or exteriority and vice versa, the vanishing point where outside and inside, materiality and intelligibility become indistinguishable' (Cheah, 1996: 122) .
These ideas are of interest when discussing the concept of liminality because to participate in the idealized cyberutopia, one must leave one's body behind. In order to maintain that disembodiment, there would have to be 'impossible impermeability' between the online and offline worlds. For Grosz (2001) , the question of Butler's impermeability of the body can be brought to the relationship of the person to the computer. Grosz (2001: 87) asks, 'Can the computer screen act as the clear-cut barrier separating cyberspace from real space, the space of mental inhabitation from the physical space of corporeality? What if the boundary is more permeable than the smooth glassy finality of the screen?'.
Grosz's exploration of the concept of virtuality (specifically in terms of spatiality and architecture) addresses and rejects precisely this idea of cyberspace as a 'containable, separable field, entered voluntarily ' (2001: 88) .
Instead, Grosz calls for a new understanding of virtuality that is not limited to cyberspace or 'virtual reality', but rather to our understanding of reality itself. In a similar vein as Barad's intra-agency, Grosz (2001: 88) calls for 'reconceptualizing the real and the relations of embeddedness, the nesting or interimplication … of the virtual and real within each other'. For Grosz, it is the 'in-betweenness' that needs to be explored -not the product of intra-agency, or the product of materialization, but rather the performance, the phenomenon-in-the-making, the becoming, the space between one bounded entity to another. Like torsion as the vanishing point of inside and outside -where what is becomes what it is not - Grosz (2001: 92) describes the 'in-between' as 'the space of the bounding and undoing of the identities which constitute it'.
Liminality, I would argue, is the experience of torsion -the performative act of crossing (permeating) a threshold, a transitional act of body-apparatus intra-agency. Liminality is the bodily experience that denies the false dichotomy of leaving the body behind; it is the simultaneous experience of intra-agency among multiple agents. Understanding liminality as the ability to freely represent one's self in cyberspace is a too-simple appreciation of the term. Liminality is the bodily experience of intra-agency, which includes the agency of the apparatus to limit and enable certain phenomena, including processes of self-representation.
It is possible, since intra-agency exists in all practices and phenomena, to argue that liminality is a universal, constant experience. I would not deny this. All experiences are to some degree liminal, and involve the experience of the 'in-between' or of torsion; that is, all experiences are performative acts that are in some way transitional. However, I will argue that some experiences are more liminal than others; or more precisely, felt and experienced as more liminal. A 'more liminal' phenomenon occurs when the balance of agency is skewed in a particular articulation of body-apparatus. Let us return to the example of the deep-sea diver: when on land, the diving equipment has no more intraagency than its materiality -its mass and spatial dimensions. In the sea, the intra-agency of apparatus and body is significantly more; the apparatus drastically limits and enables the abilities of the user. Thus, the experience of diving is a liminal one; one in which the torsion of crossing the threshold of extant possibilities is evident. It is not possible for a human body to breathe underwater. However, the phenomenon of breathing underwater is possible through the intra-agency of body-apparatus.
In the same vein, it is a computer and/or the associated technologies that allow a user to enter cyberspace. Thus, the phenomenon of 'being online' is a liminal experience in that one experiences the intra-agency of body-apparatus. The apparatus that allows one to enter this space (to cross the threshold, to experience the torsion of outside/body-inside/ mind as bodily-apparatus-cyberspace) has intra-agency beyond its own materiality on our desktops or in our hands. It is evident to users that the apparatus is intra-agential with the user; indeed, the experience becomes so powerfully liminal that users are aware of and construct their performances with the belief that they leave their bodies behind and enter a disembodied place -a space that is an interior (mind) made exterior (visible and/or present to others). A user's experience of 'going online' is thus a liminal experience of torsion, a crossing of multiple thresholds. These liminal acts belie the impermeability of our dualisms; we are constantly crossing the various lines between interior and exterior. Users consistently cross between the online world and offline world, and in this liminal state participate in many interactions which involve a complex interplay of self-technology and self-other.
Acknowledging liminality -the experience of torsion -is important to feminist scholars in terms of recognizing the constant experience of the in-between, of torsion and of crossing thresholds. Just as Butler (1999) held that drag performances are subversive in terms of bringing to the fore the idea that all gender is performance, the evident and experienced liminality of cyberspace recognizes that all experiences cross thresholds, and limiting liberation to liminal spaces like the internet thus unnecessarily delimits the possibilities of transformation in other ('real') spaces.
The concept of liminality developed here is a small step toward developing more nuanced approaches to understanding our relationship with new media. New media scholars, feminist or not, would benefit from challenging the seductive simplicity of the mind/body dualism; in order to engage with increasingly complex new media environments scholars need increasingly complex conceptual tools. For feminist scholars studying new media, and the internet in particular, developing these conceptual tools can lead to a fresh take on cyberfeminism.
'Rehabilitating' cyberfeminism as a site for further research
In their tone-setting work on cyberfeminism, editors Susan Hawthorne and Renate Klein defined cyberfeminism as a 'philosophy which acknowledges, firstly, that there are differences in power between women and men specifically in the digital discourse; and secondly, that CyberFeminists want to change that situation ' (1999: 2) . In the decade since their words, cyberfeminism has grown to encompass a myriad of issues. Cyberfeminism is enacted variously by academics and activists and is cited and tested by theorists and those in the digital trenches. Why then attempt to 'rehabilitate' a term so diffuse?
The term cyberfeminism offers scholars shorthand for addressing the exceedingly complex concepts surrounding gender, power, and digital technologies. As our intraactions with technology become more complex, such examples of shorthand are both useful and problematic. Periodically unpacking such terms maintains their validity and viability in scholarship; such effort to reconnect real-world phenomena with theory is a consistently unfinished and open project.
As a shorthand term in scholarship, cyberfeminism has diffused in several directions. One such direction rejoices in the internet as a utopia as the body is left behind (discussed previously). A second direction understands the internet and virtual reality technologies as incorporating the body in a way that neither a distinct body nor technology remains, but a third entity is created, a cyborg. In response to this, I cite Langellier and Peterson's study of bloggers: 'While technology extends the body's capability to participate in storytelling, it does not make the body into an extension of the computer … it is the lived-body, the conscious experience of communication, that provides the basis for its technological extension' (Langellier and Peterson, 2004: 167) . This direction in cyberfeminism, spurred and extended by authors such as Donna Haraway (1991) and N. Katherine Hayles (1999) , has much potential to explore our future relationships with technologies as these technologies become enmeshed in our own fleshed bodies. However, the cyborg figure as primary in cyberfeminism tends to divorce the locally bound and experienced sociopolitical context from the self-technology axis.
The most salient version of cyberfeminist scholarship available today addresses the relationships between the lived experiences of women/users and the technology itself. As Sunden (2001: 222) describes, this position attempts to 'articulate the importance for women to incorporate new electronic media into their lives without handing over control. The important question is not whether a woman can be correctly described as working class, lesbian or woman of color, but instead how the personal and political impact that communication technology has in women's daily lives can be addressed and analyzed'. It is this cyberfeminism which would serve as a useful platform to build feminist work regarding new media. Studies that explore the agency of users while simultaneously addressing the power of the internet and its associated technologies to shape, encourage and restrain those experiences, would 'go some way to rectifying the overconcentration in much academic (and other) writing on virtuality, on the separation of mind and body during Internet use, by focusing instead on how online "virtuality" and offline "reality" constitute each other' (McGerty, 2000: 897) .
This cyberfeminism would encourage the empowerment of women from their particular embodied experiences and their experiences of gender, class, race, and other identities, rather than through erasure or mechanization of the body. It would entail an emphasis on the medium as well as the embodied experience of and with the medium. A new cyberfeminism would account for intra-agency and address the particularities of users' experiences in their totality, rather than falling back into mind/body dualism.
Feminist scholars interested in the internet as a locus and focus should reframe their discussion from the limitations/repercussions of gender performance online (or bringing the body online, etc.) and the limitations or qualities of the medium online as if they are two wholly unrelated things -they are not, they are both discourses or apparatuses that enable/limit what we can do or can't do online. Each apparatus is an articulation of body-medium, and to ignore that is to fall easily into the cyberutopian cadence, ignoring both the body and the lived experiences of users. A user's experience is a performance in which both the agency of the user and the apparatus come into play, as well as the agencies of other users, other algorithms. The concept of intra-agency shapes all performance; the more limited concept of liminality more specifically addresses the perceived 'difference' of cyberspace.
Future research, in particular, should address the internet as a space and place. Though some scholars have attempted a geography of the internet (Madge and O'Connor, 2005) , many authors refuse to view the internet as a place, despite the language we use to talk about it (i.e. I 'go' online, I 'surf,' I 'visit'). Waskul, in particular, articulates a familiar argument about the internet:
The internet, by definition, dislocates 'space' from 'place.' From the 'space' of an individual's home or office they access 'places' on the internet that are without 'space' themselves … . In spite of common jargon of 'surfing' or 'visiting' locations on the internet, in truth those 'places' are transmitted from one locality to any and all user's varied geographic 'space'. (2005: 54) Grosz (2001) has made progress in using the vocabulary and concepts of architecture (by definition the study of space) to both real and 'virtual' places. Scholars should continue to develop these explorations of the internet as a place and space, as well as exploring what the distinctive experiences and practices online offer understandings of the lived experiences in 'real' space.
This article is a call to arms to theorists of digital media, particularly the internet. Rejecting cyberutopian fantasies will allow us to pursue the embodied experiences of internet users, and to more fully appreciate the relationships of self and technology. Developing or interrogating concepts such as liminality will expand our theoretical 'tool box' and in turn enrich our scholarship. Cyberfeminism has potential as a rich position from which to theorize the complexities of new media; so long as cyberfeminism acknowledges and embraces corporeality as a necessary component of its position.
